Reassessing Indonesia’s Plan to Increase Defence Budget

by Alfin Febrian Basundoro

During the defense leadership meeting held by the Indonesian Ministry of Defense in January 2025, Brigadier General Frega Inkiriwang, the ministry’s spokesperson, highlighted the plan to increase the defense budget. Inkiriwang stated that the future defense budget will be increased to 1% and gradually to 1.5% of the gross domestic product (GDP), up from the current 0.8%. While one may expect the budget hike to be optimized for military modernization, the reality might be more complex and concerning. Instead, these additional funds might also be used to support the expansion of military presence in civilian sectors, strengthening the military’s role as a dominant political force and further exacerbating civil-military relations in Indonesia.

President Prabowo Subianto has prioritized defense modernization, arguing that national prosperity is closely linked to security and Indonesia needs a strong and capable military. Over the past decade, Indonesia’s defense sector has consistently been underfunded, with a budget of no more than 0.8% of its GDP. In 2024, Indonesia’s defense budget only stood at slightly more than 139 trillion rupiah (US$ 9.4 billion), or 0.79% of its GDP. More than 50% of this budget is allocated to managerial spending, including salary and other operational expenses, and only one-third of it is allocated for equipment maintenance and modernization. Additionally, less than 1% of the budget is allocated to support soldiers’ education and welfare.

Given this limited defense budget, the plan for the budget increase is a bold move. If Indonesia successfully raises its defense spending to 1.5% of GDP by 2029, the budget would effectively double, providing greater resources for acquiring and maintaining key military assets. This would enable Indonesia to sustain its future naval and aerial fleets, including the Thaon di Revel-class frigates and Dassault Rafale fighter jets, which are critical for securing strategic areas such as the North Natuna Sea. Additionally, Jakarta is in the process of acquiring two Scorpene-class submarines, which will expand its submarine fleet to six.

Beyond equipment procurement, the budget increase can be allocated to enhance soldiers’ basic needs, including personal equipment. For example, the budget can be spent to equip more regular units with optical sights and body armor, enhancing soldiers' ability to conduct a more complex military operation. The increased military education spending will enable the officer corps to study abroad to gain external insights and strengthen Indonesia’s defense cooperation with its strategic partners.

However, the similarly expansive territorialism agenda might hinder this ambitious modernization plan. Only several weeks after the announcement of the budget hike, the Indonesian Army (TNI AD) declared the plan to establish new territorial commands, including 22 regional military commands (Komando Daerah Militer/Kodam), a significant increase from the current 15 to 37. Furthermore, the TNI AD plans to form 100 new “developmental battalions” (batalion pembangunan) in the coming years and deploy them in the districts, to support national developmental policies such as the nationwide free meal programs.

Establishing those new military territorial commands will obviously increase the military presence in many regions, as it will be followed by the formation of subordinate commands, such as the sub-regional commands (Korem) and district commands (Kodim). Moreover, the personnel under these commands are expected to engage in non-military duties, including assisting the development of the agricultural sector, helping distribute free meals, and handling healthcare facilities. Reports indicated that recruiting new personnel to fill these upcoming commands is already beginning across various regions. While subsequent budget cuts in February 2025 suggest some adjustments to policy priorities, there are no clear indications that the military expansion plans will be canceled.

This shift signals a resurgence of the military’s influence in civilian governance, echoing the historical “dual function” (dwifungsi) doctrine. This concept, which has arisen since the 1960s and became central under the Suharto-led New Order era dictatorship, defines the two key roles of the Indonesian military: as a defense apparatus tasked with maintaining national sovereignty and as a political actor involved in regional governance, social order, and economic development. The current resurgence of this doctrine is further supported by proposed revisions to the TNI law, which, if passed, will allow active-duty officers to hold civilian positions under the justification that the military should contribute to national development and support the improvement of civilian sectors.

The proposed TNI law expands the number of civilian institutions within the central government that active military personnel can occupy from 10 to 15. Some officials justify this increase by citing TNI’s ample human resources, which they argue could help alleviate overstretched government institutions and enhance bureaucratic effectiveness. However, this policy risks undermining the career progression of civilian staff. The appointment of active military personnel to leadership positions in government agencies and state-owned enterprises could reinforce favoritism, and given the TNI’s strong esprit de corps, it may further limit opportunities for civilian professionals to attain strategic roles.

Furthermore, this expansion of military presence poses two other risks. First, it diverts significant resources from the military modernization efforts, as logistical and administrative costs associated with establishing new military commands will strain the budget. More worryingly, it threatens Indonesia’s democratic progress by reinforcing military dominance in civilian affairs. Increased militarization of governance, characterized by hierarchy, secrecy, and limited checks and balances, undermines civilian control over defense policy and weakens democratic institutions. As a result, this expansion will weaken the civilian supremacy over the military in Indonesia, exacerbating post-New Order civil-military relations.

Along with the issue of human resource overstretch within the central governmental agencies, policymakers should focus on reforming human resource development to ensure that strategic positions are filled by competent civilian staff who can perform effectively. This would eliminate the need to appoint active military personnel to civilian roles. Furthermore, more significant public scrutiny is needed to prevent further concern about the potential de-professionalization of the military and oversee the raise of defense budget to support the defense modernization. In this case, the role of civil societies, especially those that focus on strategic and defense policy, becomes more essential. Additionally, a strong legislative branch with a robust capacity to scrutinize military affairs is critical to ensuring civilian supremacy over the military and maintaining Indonesia’s democratic integrity.

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Defense Policy and Strategic Division

About the writer

Alfin Febrian Basundoro is a master’s degree (advanced) student in Strategic Studies at The Australian National University in Canberra, Australia. His research focuses on the middle power strategic policy, defense modernization, and maritime security. His pieces are published in East Asia Forum, Lowy Institute, Detik, Jawa Pos, and RSIS Commentaries.