Written by :
Han Kyeol
Minimum essential force is the posture taken by TNI (Indonesian Military) to modernize itself, meet international/ regional standards, secure Indonesia’s territory, sovereignty and wellbeing for Indonesians. In 2009 TNI committed itself to reaching this goal. Fast forward 15 years, Indonesia’s maritime and cyberspace sovereignty are often violated, and military equipment are outdated. These realities compelled observers and government officials to admit that TNI failed to meet the set target.
Some blamed the usual scapegoat such as corruption, COVID-19 pandemic and perhaps skill issues. While these might be correct answers, they are not particularly useful as they don’t provide deeper insight into the matter. Structural issues both at domestic and international levels need to be identified. Indonesia’s internal balancing endeavors such as improving the quality and quantity of its armed forces should be observed. Additionally, externally balancing efforts such as cooperating with other states to contend against a common adversary need to be observed as well. With the end goal of both balancing and MEF being to make Indonesia more secure, scrutinizing Indonesian military’s balancing effort will be an adequate starting point.
First and foremost, funding and personnels for the Indonesian army are swelled up out of proportion. The combined budget for the Navy and the AirForce does not even amount to that of the army. The reason for this could be because most of Indonesia’s military campaigns since the revolutionary war to quelling separatism to this today were focused on land. To successfully carry out these land-based missions, increasing budget and personnel were granted to the army, while the Navy and the AirForce remained in supporting roles. Today however, except for the separatists in Papua, the threat that needs to be addressed by TNI mainly lies in seas and cyberspace and so far, TNI has yet to adapt its focus and resources.
Funding and personnels aside, Indonesia’s maritime agencies are riddled with bureaucratic redundancies. There are 3 agencies which answer to different ministries that all tend to maritime security and law enforcement, aside from the Navy and the coast guard. Although cooperations between these 5 agencies are largely publicized and discussions on combining them except the Navy were underway, legal technicalities have hindered the process, costing unnecessary administrative costs and manpower.
Another hinderance to TNI could be the absence of the up or out policy. To many Indonesians, career in TNI represent stability and longevity, on the flipside however this also creates space for career stagnation for personnel. Implementation of the up or out policy could solve this problem and remove the need for governments to pass laws that allow active personnel to take positions in civilian institutions.
The problem also lies outside of TNI. Indonesia’s defense industry lacks innovation. Take the US, ROK, Italy and France, top arms exporters. All these countries host robust arms industries where profit motivated private arm producers are developed enough to compete with each other and their state-owned counterparts to produce the most efficient weapons. The same cannot be said for Indonesia. Key players in Indonesia’s defense industries are state owned arms producers that does not face serious competition. This could be causing self-satisfaction and inertia in the industry.
While internal balancing efforts are largely within Indonesia’s control, same cannot be for external balancing...
While internal balancing efforts are largely within Indonesia’s control, same cannot be for external balancing. For starters, China often violates Indonesia’s maritime territorial integrity and sovereignty but is also a major trading and investment partner. Because of this complicated relationship with China, Indonesia cannot firmly put its foot down on the security issue perpetrated by China.
Difficulties lie also with immediate neighbors, Indonesia often strived to promote unity among Southeast Asian states as a balancing strategy through defense diplomacy. However, surrounding greater powers have exposed and exploited divisions between these states and hindered Indonesia’s efforts. Instances of these can be seen in Cambodia’s reluctance to participate in joint naval exercises as to avoid angering China, due to its economic reliance on the country. On the other hand, Philippine is leaning closer to Japan and US for support in its territorial dispute with China. In short, not all Southeast Asian states uphold security and unity as its highest priority and do not share the same preferred defense partner.
Indonesia’s external balancing efforts are hindered with obstacles after another, namely multifaceted relations with great powers and lack of coordination among immediate partners. Despite these difficulties, there are domestic issues that can be solved which can help Indonesia inch closer to MEF goals. They include, refocusing manpower and budget based on threat, policy reforms to root out bureaucratic redundancies and stagnation and finally allowing competition among arms producer to build a sturdy indigenous defense industry. These reforms would not guarantee lasting security for Indonesia, but it provides a stronger fighting chance. With Indonesia’s president elect repeatedly emphasizing national and regional security, expectations regarding improvement could be understandably high.
The obstacles ahead are demanding, however Indonesia’s success in its war on terror up till the late 2010s proves that it is not helpless when faced with adversity against its sovereignty and security. The Bali bombings was a sobering reality check which drove the government to swiftly make structural changes such as passing various terrorism laws, executing perpetrators as well as cooperating with the US and Australia in funding and training task forces. Although dealing with the military is a different endeavor, Indonesia’s experience should serve as a reminder as to make reforms before further damage is done.
References
https://news.detik.com/berita/d-7126873/jubir-prabowo-ungkap-alasan-mef-tak-capai-target-di-2024
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2023/07/17/14362411/ada-apa-dengan-bakamla-dan-kplp?page=all
https://www.e-ir.info/2014/02/12/balance-of-power-theory-in-todays-international-system/
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/15/how-war-on-terror-was-fought-won-in-southeast-asia-for-now
Disclaimer
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Related to
Defense Policy and Strategic Division
About the Writer
Han Kyeol Kim is an Indonesian citizen, Independent writer and graduate from UPH's bachelor's in International relations. Areas of interested in geopolitics, Southeast Asian studies, and Indonesian foreign policy.
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